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AlmmONY: Tnitn 12 SECTiON 1289 OKLAHOMA STATUTES

TiTm

"ALIMONY PAYMENTs-TERINAThD"

The Thirtieth Legislature Regular Session enacted into law Section
1289 of Title 121 entitled: "An Act relating to divorce and alimony; peritting a judge to terminate payments upon death or remarriage." The
statute reads as follows: "In a divorce decree which provides for periodic
payments of alimony, the court may, in its discretion, declare that the
obligation to pay future installments automatically ceases on the death or
remarriage of the person receiving the alimony."
A thorough examination of the statute, considering cases construing
the existing alimony statute,2 reveals three important problems which will
directly effect its construction and application. The problems are: The
necessity of the divorce decree fixing a definite, ascertainable alimony
award; the effect of a contingency in the decree on the amount of alimony ultimatly to be paid; and the inability to modify a valid alimony
decree after the term of court in which the judgment was rendered. To
provide a basis for resolving these problems, and to aid in understanding
the import of the statute, certain concepts should be defined.
The rule for statutory construction in Oklahoma is: '"Words used
in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except where
a contrary intention plainly appears .... ,,3
Alimony has been defined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as an
allowance for support of the wife.4 Alimony is provided for by statute,
the portion pertinent to this discussion being: "[Allimony may be allowed to her in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing to her
such sum of money, payable in gross or in installments as the court may
deem just and equitable....,,5
The statute under consideration must first be examined with reference to the nature of the alimony allowed as it appears to be ambiguous
in that regard. The existing alimony statute provides for "a sum of money,
payable in gross or in installments... ." (Emphasis added). The new starute sets forth the following language: "In a divorce decree which provides for periodic payments of alimony... " (Emphasis added.) Is the
language of the new statute to be construed as authorizing "periodic alimony," that is, an allowance of alimony requiring no fixed ascertainable
amount to be paid or does it anticipate an extension of "alimony in gross,"
a sum certain, payable in installments?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has construed the existing alimony
statute as providing the wife an allowance in a fixed and definite sum of
I OKLA. SEss. LAWs 1965, ch. 344, § 1.
2 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1278 (1961).
3 25 OKLA. STAT. 5 1 (1961).

4 Noel v. Noel, 206 Okla. 16, 18, 240 P.2d 739, 742 (1952).
5 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1278 (1961).
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money, referred to as "alimony in gross."8 In applying the rule of alimony in gross the court has held that where the decree providing for alimony does not fix the amount ultimately to be paid the decree is void as
to the alimony award. The award of alimony in gross may, however, be
paid in installments.8
In Dutton v. Dutton,9 the plaintiff was awarded alimony in the
amount of $100.00 per month until her child became twenty-four years
of age. In the event the child died prior to its twenty-fourth year the
plaintiff was to receive $50.00 per month thereafter until she remarried.
The court, interpreting the decree as providing child support rather than
alimony, said: "The whole authority of the court for decreeing alimony
is found in this section, 10 and no authorization is here found for decreeing
alimony in monthly or other payments without limitation of the amount
to be paid."11
To construe a statute, "words in common use are to be given their
plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning in the absence of any
statutory or well established technical meaning....-12 Furthermore, in
order to determine the legislative intent, the act to be construed must be
considered together with all other enactments upon the same subjectPa
Considering the unanimity of cases construing Section 1278 of Tide 12
in conjunction with the rules of statutory construction, there is but one
conclusion to be drawn regarding the nature of the alimony award now
authorized. The legislative intent embodied in the act is aimed at providing for an allowance of alimony in gross; that is, a sum of money, payable
in gross or in installments, and not periodic alimony, or alimony to be
paid with no requirement as to an ascertainable amount ultimately to be
paid.
Another problem regarding interpretation of the statute is the effect of a contingency in the decree such as the death or remarriage of the
wife in relation to the requirement of a gross alimony award. Prior to the
enactment of this statute, if the obligation to pay future installments of
alimony was made contingent on the occurrence of some future event,
the court ruled the alimony portion of the decree void for lack of cer6 Dobry v. Dobry, 203 Okla. 327, 329, 220 P.2d 698, 700-01 (1950);
Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 195 Okla. 496, 497, 159 P.2d 560, 562 (1945);
Bishop v. Bishop, 194 Okla. 209, 212, 148 P.2d 472, 475 (1944); Flaxman v.
Flaxman, 169 Okla. 65, 35 P.2d 950 (1934); Dutton v. Dutton, 97 Okla. 234,
236, 223 P. 149, 150 (1923).
7 Oder v. Oder, 149 Okla. 63, 64, 299 P. 202, 203 (1931); West v. West,
134 Okla. 226, 227, 273 P. 209, 210 (1929).
8 Dobry v. Dobry, 203 Okla. 327, 220 P.2d 698 (1950), which holds that

the award must be for a sum in gross which may be paid in installments. The wife,
moreover, has an absolute property right in the gross sums allowed.
9 97 Okla. 234, 223 P. 149 (1923).
10 12 OKLA. STAT. 5 1278 (1961).
11 Dutton v. Dutton, suPranote 9, at 236, 223 P. at 150.

12 Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Muskogee v. Templeton, 184 Okla. 281, 86 P.2d 1000 (1939).
13 DoweU v. Board of Education, 185 Okla. 342, 345, 91 P.2d 771, 774
(1939).
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tainty.' 4 In Vanderslice v. Vanderslice,15 the divorce decree provided that
the defendant pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $50.00 per
month until such time as the youngest child of the marriage reached the
age of twenty-one years, the payments then to terminate. The court, quoting from a Kansas case' 6 construing a statute from which Oklahoma's starate was adopted,17 and involving a similar factual situation, stated: "'An
award of permanent alimony... payable in installments, depending on
contingencies that may or may not happen, without fixing a definite sum
to be paid, is void. ... ' ,, The court reasoned that the amount was not
definite in that the child could die prior to reaching its majority, thereby
materially lessening the amount of alimony contemplated. Conversely, the
Nebraska Supreme Court, confronted with a similar situation,' 9 sustained the award of alimony basing their decision on the presumption that
the minor child would live to attain its majority. The court stated that the
amount of alimony awarded was ascertainable from the face of the decree.
In the Dutton case where an alimony award subject to a contingency
was disallowed, the court said: "'M-]o authorizationis here found for decreeing alimony in monthly or other periodical payments without limitation of the amount to be paid." 20 It appears that the new statute expressly
authorizes a contingency to be placed on the gross amount awarded to the
wife-her death or remarriage-and provides the authorization lacking at
the time of the decision in the Dutton case.
The final problem to be resolved is the inability to modify a valid
alimony decree after the term of court in which the decree was rendered.
The rule in Oklahoma is that the amount of alimony awarded is to be
determined by the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of
the divorce and in the absence of fraud or mistake may not be modified
due to subsequent changes in circumstances. 2' This rule is subject only to
the exception that all judgments, decrees or other orders, however conclusive, are under the control of the court pronouncing them, and may
be set aside, vacated or modified during the term in which they were
rendered. 22 The statute under discussion provides in part: "In a divorce
decree ... the court may ... declare...." (Emphasis added.) This indicates that it is contemplated that the provision be incorporated into the
final divorce decree. In addition, the inclusion in the statute of the words
14 Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 195 Okla. 496, 497, 159 P.2d 560, 562
(1945). But cf. Chilton v. Chilton, 207 Okla. 647, 252 P.2d 121 (1952).
15 195 Okla. 496, 159 P.2d 560 (1945).

10 Catren v. Catren, 136 Kan. 864, 18 P.2d 134 (1933).
17 GEN. STAT. KAN., 1889, par. 4756.
Is Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, supra note 14.
'9 Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921).
20 Dutton v. Dutton, supra note 9, at 236, 223 P. at 150. (Emphasis added.)
21 Bishop v. Bishop, 194 Okla. 209, 212, 148 P.2d 472, 475 (1944); Gilcrease v. Gilcrease, 186 Okla. 451, 453, 98 P.2d 906, 907 (1939); Bowen v.
Bowen, 182 Okla. 114, 116, 76 P.2d 900, 902 (1938); Anderson v. Anderson,
140 Okla. 168, 172, 282 P.335, 338 (1929).
22 Chilton v. Chilton, 207 Okla. 647, 648, 252 P.2d 121, 122 (1952); 12
OKLA. STAT. 9 1031, 1038 (1961).
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